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International Issues

REGIONAL AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS

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

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INTERNATIONAL ISSUES

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(Continued)

The article assesses the possibility for a major decline in US-Mexican relations as Mexican foreign policy changes in response to mounting domestic economic problems, possible modification of its foreign policy-making process, and the prospect that it will become a major oil exporter in the 1980s.

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

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

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The Rise of Second Order Powers: New Complications for US Regional Interests in Africa and Elsewhere

The specter of superpower competition in southern Africa has long been perceived by the US as potentially inimical to the pursuit of its political and economic interests in the area. In the short term, as demonstrated by the turmoil created by Soviet and Cuban intervention in Angola, the intrusion of hostile foreign powers into the region can, in fact, adversely affect major US foreign policy goals.

Superpower competition may not prove to be the most difficult obstacle to achieving US regional interests in Africa or elsewhere, however. A newer unsettling force, just beginning to appear in Africa, is the rise of potential regional or "second order" powers which are increasingly capable of and aggressive in pursuing their own national interests, sometimes to the detriment of those of the US. Clearly, the new assertiveness of these nations will affect their bilateral relations with the US. But they also have the potential to alter US relations with the entire region as potential second order powers attempt aggressively to extend their influence.

In southern Africa, Nigeria has the most obvious potential to become a second order power. Its military rulers are aware of this potential and, for the last two years, have followed an extremely active foreign policy in pursuit of enhanced regional status. Particularly dramatic has been the shift in Nigerian foreign policy to a much more activist, militant stance on the issue of ending white minority rule in Rhodesia, Namibia, and South Africa. The military regime has also backed moves to make Nigeria the economic spokesman for the area, both to encourage wider intra-African economic cooperation and, through combined strength, to gain greater leverage in dealing with the outside (particularly the developed) world.

At the moment, while other African states may be uneasy about Nigeria's intentions, it has little competition in its drive for regional leadership. Although

South Africa also has the necessary political, economic, and military attributes to strive for second order status, it is obviously constrained, at least for now, by its position as a virtual pariah. Two other possible competitors, Zaire and Egypt, are also not presently in the running. Zaire is wracked by political and economic instability. Egypt's geopolitical orientation is primarily towards the Middle East. Future developments, however, such as new stability and growth for Zaire or an expanded concern by Egypt for the security of its southern flank could project them into the competition.

*The rise of potential second order powers is affecting US interests in every region of the developing world. The essay that follows, which summarizes a longer working paper, is an effort to assess this phenomenon. It sets forth an analytical framework for identifying potential second order powers, for assessing how they interact in a regional context, and for comprehending what kind of new regional power and influence patterns may appear and how these will affect US foreign policy alternatives.**

The Changing International System

Two trends are shaping a change in the relative freedom of action of the US and certain developing countries in the international arena. First, the US is increasingly constrained from using its power and influence to resolve in its favor disputes with smaller states. That is, the rapidly growing interrelatedness of international problems is raising the costs to the US of bringing influence to bear on any single issue. Uncertainty about the outcome of attempting to impose unilateral solutions is increasing because the consequences of exercising that influence will often spill over the boundaries of the specific problem to be addressed.

Secondly, power differentials among developing countries are growing rapidly. At the top end of the spectrum a few countries--such as Brazil, Venezuela, Iran, India, Turkey, Nigeria, and Indonesia--seem to be developing the institutions, leadership, and economic base that both underpin and are part of the process that can lead to rapid and

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sustained modernization. While the political and economic fortunes of these countries are reversible and do, in fact, fluctuate considerably, nevertheless they have reached the stage in development where they have both the need and ability to project their influence noticeably and persistently into their regions and to some extent into the international arena as well. In particular, the new relevance of global economic issues to foreign policy is strengthening the influence potential of those developing nations which either control essential raw materials or which are undergoing rapid economic growth.

In a few instances countries like Brazil are beginning to achieve status as second order powers and to develop their own regional spheres of influence virtually without opposition. For the most part, however, new regional power balances have not been established; uncertainty with respect to how regional politics will evolve exists because two or more states are potential or actual competitors for intraregional superiority. The politics of these regions are becoming increasingly complex as the number, frequency, and intensity of the interactions of these potential regional powers multiplies both among themselves and with the smaller states of their regions.

Identification and Interaction of Potential Second Order Powers

Potential second order powers can be identified by a number of attributes that they either possess or are striving towards. Among the qualities they will have in greater abundance than the other nations of their region are the following:

--An articulated sense of national purpose that motivates the leadership to strive for regional dominance.

--Relatively strong and effective domestic political and economic institutions which produce internal stability and sustained growth.

--Sufficient military power to be perceived by other states of the region as capable of achieving essential national security goals.

--An expanding industrial base and a growing capacity to absorb and use advanced technology.

--A sizable (in comparison with other LDCs) pool of personnel for service abroad.

--Sufficient economic, cultural, and political homogeneity or complementarity with the countries of the region to allow it to act as an integrative rather than disruptive force.

Some aspects of regional interaction directly affect the ability of any potential second order power to achieve regional dominance. For example, although a state's basic potential for exerting influence depends on the sources of national power it possesses (population, raw materials, industrial base, and the like), its actual ability to influence other states depends additionally on the current needs of the other states of the region. If the mix of capabilities and goals of one state are particularly congruent with the susceptibilities of the other states, then it will have a distinct initial advantage in attempting to expand its influence in the area. If, to the contrary, its capabilities do not match well the susceptibilities of the other states, then its ability to exert influence will be more limited even if it is nominally the most powerful state in the region.

In order to understand how political relationships may evolve in any particular region, and especially which countries are moving most rapidly and certainly towards regional power status, a set of criteria for measuring change must be sought. In part these criteria will involve assessing internal economic and political development within each potential second order power since each increment of additional economic strength, internal political unity, and governing efficiency enhances national power, and therefore, a country's putative ability to influence or coerce the other countries in its region.

Of probable greater importance, however, in terms of whether relations within a region are actually changing are criteria for determining if a country is converting its potential power into an actual reach for new influence. Some of the indicators that might be watched are the following:

--Restructuring of military forces to enhance regional deployment and sea control capabilities.

--Substantial new commitment of national manpower resources to regional diplomatic, commercial, technical training, or military activities.

--Changes in immigration policies and tourist flows which have the effect of noticeably increasing the movement of people between the potential second order power and the countries of its region.

--Efforts to increase transportation and communication ties with the region (for example, expansion and redirection of national shipping and airlines to other states in the area; extension of road or railroad networks, or electrical power grids into adjoining states).

--Significant new trade or investment initiatives, especially efforts to supply goods or capital vital to another regional state's modernization plans.

--A drive to expand social contacts, especially with rising young leaders from other regional states through such means as increased educational exchanges or offers to host regional organizations.

External ties will also affect the evolution of power distribution within a region. For example, one of the marks of a developing second order power is the ability to increase its autonomy of action in certain spheres, such as direction of trade, often at an apparent cost to the interests of the major power upon which it has been traditionally dependent. As potential second order powers strive for dominance in a region, therefore, the strongest competitor will often be the one which can obtain the most benefits from its major power relationship at the least cost to its ability to act independently.

In addition to a profitable major power relationship, a developing second order power will usually establish a number of mutually beneficial relationships with second order powers outside its own region. These relationships are an important recognition of its rising power status and often provide enhanced influence in its dealings with

other nations. Thus, Venezuela's influence in Latin America, Nigeria's in Africa, and Indonesia's in Asia are all strengthened by their alliance, through OPEC, with other extraregional second order powers.

Implications

The increased capability of some developing nations to assert their national interests either bilaterally with the US or in multilateral forums by forming coalitions with other developing nations appears to be a significant new development in international politics. But the power differential between the developed and the developing world (and particularly between the US and potential competitors among developing nations) remains vast. Thus, the rise of second order powers, either alone or in loose coalitions, will probably not prove an unmanageable obstacle for realizing essential US policy preferences, at least over the short to medium term.

Of much greater moment to US policymaking will be the unstable environment likely to be created in most of the geopolitical regions of the developing world by the quest for new influence by the leading nations in each of these regions. For one thing, as the number of states that can affect US regional interests increases and as the competition for power and influence among them grows, deciding which states to support on which issues will become much more complicated. More generally, both the struggle for dominance and uncertainty as to the outcome are likely to bring about turmoil in which US interests, to the extent they are best served by maintenance of the status quo or very slow and orderly evolution, will often suffer.

Within this broad trend, a variety of types of regional power and influence alignments may appear, each of which will pose different opportunities and challenges to US relations with the countries in that area. Major powers, such as the US, will have some ability to affect whatever regional patterns that evolve. But it is likely that the primary influence shaping regional trends will be developments *within* the region itself. Eventually, in some regions a single dominant power may emerge. In that circumstance US relations with the region as a whole will probably be determined largely by the state of bilateral

relations with that second order power, and as a corollary, the US will be able increasingly to devote most of its attention in that region to that single relationship.

It is much more likely, however, that issues of regional dominance will not be settled so neatly in most regions of the world in the next ten years. Three other patterns, each one depending on a different combination of conflict and cooperation among potential second order powers in a single region, could evolve. Each pattern poses somewhat different policy problems and opportunities for the US.

One pattern that might develop is a relatively cooperative but narrow set of relations between two potential regional powers. This arrangement is probably the least likely of the three to persist for a long period because it is inherently unstable if both countries are seeking to become dominant in their region. Nonetheless, it exists at least as a transitory condition in some regions today (for example, between Mexico and Venezuela in the Caribbean) and could develop in other regions, such as southern Africa, over the next five to ten years. One condition bringing about this pattern would be the continued uneven movement by two countries towards second order status in the same region in which one country moves rapidly to establish regional influence while the other (with the potential power but without much motivation) moves more slowly. Another condition under which cooperative but only moderately active relations could exist would be if their drives for regional influence began in relatively noncompetitive areas. Thus, for example, there need not be any immediate conflict between one state attempting to develop military or cultural relations with the countries in its region and another state attempting to create stronger commercial relations in the same area.

As long as the initial drive to regional influence by one country was not perceived as directly threatening or limiting by the other, they could, for some period of time, cooperate on regional and global issues, sometimes to the possible detriment of the US. This cooperation could involve, for example, closely tied positions on an issue of overriding economic importance, such as a common

oil policy towards the US by two oil producers in the same region, or on political issues of common concern, such as race among the black-dominated states of southern Africa.

The major policy problem for the US in dealing with this kind of pattern is that the level of uncertainty about how the situation will evolve is usually quite high. It is difficult to know what the long term consequences will be of a policy choice to support one country against another or to attempt to negotiate solutions that will apply to the region at large. Success and failure are difficult to predict since regional relationships are often changing, or soon likely to change, rapidly. The opposite side of this coin is that, simply because regional relationships are unstable, opportunities for exerting influence from outside may be greater and may have more impact now than when regional patterns are more firmly established.

Another possible pattern would feature a persistent high level of conflict between two competitors for regional domination. Policy options for the US in this case might range from neutrality (if no major US interest were threatened), to attempting to mediate or moderate the conflict (particularly, for example, if the opponents possessed crude nuclear capabilities and the conflict was verging on open warfare), to intercession on the side of a preferred candidate for control of the region. Two regions where this kind of pattern might develop are South America (between Brazil and Argentina should the latter recover economically) and South Asia (between Iran and India).

A third pattern that might develop is an implicit balance-of-power arrangement in which two (or possibly three) potential regional powers agreed on the division of the area into subregional spheres of influence. This might occur in the Caribbean, for example, if Mexico became the dominant influence in Central America, Cuba among the Caribbean island states, and Venezuela turned its attention primarily toward the west coast of South America (the Andean Pact countries). In this situation the three second order powers could choose to cooperate with each other on an issue-by-issue basis, leaving the US to deal with them bilaterally on problems involving their subregional spheres of influence and multilaterally

(either negotiating a regional settlement or attempting to divide them) on regional issues or global issues on which they have attempted to reach a regional position.

Whatever power patterns develop in individual regions the likelihood is that, over the next five to ten years, regional politics in general will become more complex, more relevant to the shape of the global political system, and of greater importance to US policymaking. In a few areas, making policy choices may become relatively simpler if a single second order power develops which will take on some responsibility for economic growth and political stability in the area. In most others, however, regional politics may complicate international relations generally and create difficult policy choices for the US, especially if competition for dominance in a region escalates to open conflict. Finally, it is highly probable that US interests in every region, whether political relations within the region are peaceful or discordant, will come under increasingly critical scrutiny, and even attack, as regional interests and concerns become more sharply defined and aggressively expressed.

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The Politics of the Industrialized States in the North-South Dialogue

The meetings of working level coordinating groups at the Conference on International Economic Cooperation (CIEC) in Paris have concluded. On May 26-27 senior political officials are scheduled to take over where the technicians left off, and a ministerial level meeting will attempt to wrap up the 18-month conference on May 31 - June 1.

The significance for North-South relations of the ambivalence of key LDCs over bloc solidarity and confrontation with the industrialized countries was discussed last month in International Issues. *This article examines some of the political dynamics among the industrialized states that affect the North-South dialogue. The central argument is that despite the considerable tactical benefits that would flow from a common policy towards North-South issues, the industrialized countries' search for a common stand has been, and will continue to be, complicated by fundamental differences in basic interests. These differences among the OECD members over North-South issues are of concern because they reinforce the tendency to move the management of complex issues out of international forums and into either smaller groups or the realm of bilateral relations. A major implication of such a trend would be to complicate the management of those global issues such as nuclear proliferation and terrorism that may not be amendable to regional and bilateral solutions.*

Notwithstanding their complaints about lack of progress in negotiations on their demands for a new international economic order, the developing states have done rather well through diplomacy in building momentum in the so-called North-South dialogue. Issues raised by, and demands of, the developing countries that several years ago would have been considered beyond the realm of negotiation by the industrialized countries are now under consideration or on the verge of being adopted in modified fashion. The most visible example of this trend

is the readiness of the industrialized countries to agree to talks that could lead to a common fund to stabilize commodity prices. This apparent "concession" is couched in several layers of conditional language, but an agreement that previously would have been anathema to the major industrialized states, now seems near. A major factor in the LDCs' ability to exact the series of incremental diplomatic concessions that put the common fund so prominently on the agenda of the North-South dialogue has been the lack of a coordinated position among the industrialized states.

Lack of Unity

There are a number of reasons for the difficulty that the industrialized countries have had in the last three and one half years in reaching a united stand on North-South issues. Initially the search for common positions was felt to be postponable because the nature of LDC demands was so diffuse as to preclude a meaningful reply. Moreover, progress toward common positions was repeatedly stymied as the political leadership of virtually every major industrialized state changed hands. Pervasive domestic economic difficulties, varying degrees of support among domestic constituencies for cooperation with the LDCs, and differing perceptions of what minimum concessions would be necessary to avoid a return to the rhetorical confrontation of 1974-75 also inhibited development of a united position among the industrialized countries. The inability of the European Community to reach a common position has itself been a major complicating factor in the equation. While the Nine have reached a degree of consensus since their summit meeting in Rome, a new round of confrontation with the LDCs could cause this new-found agreement to fall apart.

At the same time, however, certain considerations have pushed the industrialized countries toward negotiations with the developing states notwithstanding the tactical disadvantage their lack of a common policy:

--The influential role of the Group of 77--
the LDC caucus--in such areas as law

of the sea and the GATT multilateral trade negotiations, and of the nonaligned movement on the question of Korea's status in the UN and the Middle East.

--The desirability of maintaining special political, economic, and in some cases security relationships that date back to the colonial era (for example, France's relationship with French-speaking Africa).

--Dependence of major industrialized countries on raw materials that are chiefly exported by developing countries.

--Recognition of the potential for export markets, particularly in the larger and wealthier developing countries.

--Popular opinion in some of the industrialized states that favors a constructive approach to the development of the third world.

The increasingly influential role of such potential "second order" powers as Mexico and Nigeria--discussed elsewhere in this publication--has also prompted the industrialized states to take LDC demands more seriously.

Sources of Friction

The very reasons that compel the industrialized countries to take the LDCs seriously, however, have tended to exacerbate differences among them. Virtually all of the pressures for, and arguments against, an affirmative posture by the industrialized countries are represented in the decisionmaking process of each. The complicating factor for a coordinated policy is that the structure of the pressures varies from country to country and that there are major differences in the ability of industrialized countries to implement new policies on North-South issues.

France's interest in increasing its influence in Africa is manifested by the attention the French have paid to the summit meetings of leaders of the French-speaking African states and by the concessions Paris was willing

to grant the African, Caribbean, and Pacific states through the Lome agreement. In this case France's desire to maintain or enhance its status provides one incentive not to clash with the developing states in multilateral forums.

The West Europeans and Japanese remain more heavily dependent on imports of raw materials from the developing states than does the US, and the different perceptions of this dependence are probably the most intractable of the differences that impede a common view, let alone a common policy, on the North-South problem.

Virtually all of the industrialized countries recognize the potential for increased exports to the developing countries, and domestic business constituencies exert influence to avoid clashes that would jeopardize these new markets. This very area of agreement, however, is a source of potential conflict for the industrialized states. Not only do they have to compete commercially for the markets, but broader interests may come into play, as was seen in the quarrel between the US and West Germany over German exports of nuclear technology to Brazil.

The role of public pressure within some of the industrialized countries for meaningful concessions and increased aid for LDCs cannot be minimized. The Dutch, for example, have been able to maintain pressure on their partners in the European Community for a more generous attitude, in spite of the government's caretaker status pending elections on May 25. Without broad public support the Dutch government would have been unlikely to take a stand that could raise its already hefty aid contribution to the LDCs.

Implications

The differences described above are not likely to disappear in the future. Even as the LDCs continue to exploit existing differences, new pressures may arise to further trouble industrialized country cooperation in the North-South dialogue. Slow economic growth, or a new recession; increased Soviet or Chinese involvement in North-South issues; the development of greater assertiveness on the part of regional powers such as Brazil and Nigeria; or a change in philosophy by OPEC to increase support for

LDC objectives are the kinds of events that, on the one hand, will increase the need for a common policy on the part of the industrialized states, but on the other hand, are likely to increase the strains on their unity.

In their preparation for the conclusion to the CIEC, the industrialized countries seem poorly prepared to withstand a concerted diplomatic challenge by the LDCs. Although the industrialized countries are probably better prepared than at any time since the beginning of the North-South dialogue, there are many issues on which full agreement has not been reached. LDC negotiators have been quick to exploit the tactical advantages presented by a divided opposition, and the threat of a confrontation hangs over the Conference. Even if a confrontation does not occur at CIEC, meetings of the UN General Assembly, ECOSOC, UNCTAD, GATT and the law of the sea conference will provide ample additional opportunities for the LDCs to test the industrialized countries' unity and accentuate the differences in economic and political outlook among them.

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Nonaligned Nations Pursue Goals Through Moderation

In contrast to the confrontational tactics of the past, the Coordinating Committee of the Non-Aligned Movement (NACC), which met last month in New Delhi, adopted a relatively moderate approach toward developed countries on international political and economic issues.

Although the NACC meetings are not necessarily representative of the entire movement, the mild tone of the conference communique may indicate a rethinking of LDC tactics in the North-South dialogue. The more influential nonaligned states now seem to believe that the confrontational rhetoric of the past antagonized the developed nations and also contributed to divisions among the developing states that weakened their overall bargaining influence.

The task of the NACC is to coordinate the implementation of decisions reached at previous summits. In the past, the rhetoric of the radicals often dominated the proceedings and dictated its outcome. At the April conference, however, the politically contentious issues which divide the movement and antagonize the industrialized nations were played down. The moderate members of the movement (generally the larger and wealthier LDCs) appear to have gained in influence. Radical states, such as Cuba, Algeria, and Vietnam were active at the meeting, but not in their usual anti-US fashion.

India, the host of the conference, played a major role in setting the tone of the meeting. The new Indian government wanted both to reaffirm its bona fides as a nonaligned member and to keep open the dialogue with the developed countries. Even though the initial draft communique prepared by India was considered too mild by many of the delegates, and was modified by a number of amendments, the language of the final communique was considerably more restrained than the one issued after the 1976 Non-Aligned Summit at Colombo.

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The political section of the communique contains the usual hyperbole in the descriptive paragraphs; however, most of the paragraphs calling for action are more moderate in tone than the Colombo statement and, in some instances, acknowledge promising Western initiatives. The US is mentioned by name in only a few sections, but not in the condemnatory way used in the past.

The economic section voiced frustration over the lack of appreciable change in the international economic system. It directly blamed the developed nations for the failure at the Geneva conference to agree on a Common Fund for Commodities and expressed dissatisfaction with the unresponsiveness of the developed countries to demands at the Conference on International Economic Cooperation (CIEC). Although the document emphasized dialogue rather than confrontation, it nonetheless clearly reiterated the importance of concessions by the developed countries on such key demands as transfer of resources, greater political influence in international financial institutions, and debt relief for LDCs.

It is at CIEC that the success of the wait-and-see attitude will be tested. Failure to achieve conspicuous progress on some of the goals stated in the April communique could cause the nonaligned movement to advocate a return to the North-South rhetorical confrontations of the past and seriously complicate attempts to address cooperatively such important global issues as energy shortage, food and population problems, and law of the sea.

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The Causes and Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation: Brazil and Pakistan

The following article is adapted from a draft of a forthcoming ORPA research study. In final form it will contain case studies of Brazil and Pakistan. Below is a discussion of the analytical framework, preceded by a prospectus of the complete study.

The study will address two cases where the acquisition of nuclear technology, ostensibly related to the development of an energy industry, has provoked profound concern over the spread of nuclear weapons. The two countries chosen for examination are perceived as archetypes. Brazil is an example of a rapidly developing country with aspirations for global status and regional primacy. Its immediate security concerns are few, which allows it a great degree of latitude in its relations with the major powers. Pakistan is an example of a relatively poor LDC in a position of regional inferiority. It perceives its security problems as immense. Since it expects little tangible military or political support from any major power other than China, Pakistan feels that it can and must act independently to serve its national interest.

These two countries typify two of the major categories of states that may seek to develop nuclear weapons. There are other categories, including: (1) industrialized states that refrain from developing nuclear weapons because their security interests do not require them at this time, or whose security interests would probably be harmed by an attempt at acquisition (West Germany); (2) "pariah" states with high security concerns; and (3) "paranoid" states that may at times have irresponsible leaders who may desire weapons for bizarre or high-risk purposes. Rather than attempt to categorize every potential proliferator, the aim of the study is to highlight the political forces guiding Brazil and Pakistan as a way of analyzing the factors in various combinations that may be at work in most other countries.

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Since Brazilian and Pakistani strategic geopolitical problems and international problems are so different, they provide two instructive examples of the ways in which political, economic, and technical factors can converge to present a proliferation threat. Overcoming this threat will be enormously difficult, if not impossible. In the concluding section of the study, discussion will therefore turn to a preliminary analysis of possible strategies for managing and containing the effects of proliferation when it cannot be halted.

General Considerations

The proliferation of nuclear weapons has become a phenomenon of growing worldwide concern as the number of countries possessing the technological means to fabricate atomic arms increases. The spread of the capability to build nuclear weapons has resulted from the convergence of a number of technical, economic, and political factors. The diffusion of nuclear technology has occurred at a steady pace, facilitated by the global desire for reliable and economically stable sources of energy, as well as by hopes for medical, agricultural, and industrial benefits. The spread of nuclear technology is but a special case of the general distribution of scientific and technical knowledge around the world in a fairly indiscriminate manner. This technological diffusion proceeds apace despite second thoughts as to known or suspected deleterious side effects.

Economically, the global energy crisis has provided a plausible justification for the acquisition of nuclear power. The finite supply of conventional fuels--maldistributed and increasingly expensive as they are--has stimulated interest in nuclear energy as a means of achieving and maintaining economic growth. In some cases, as in Japan, nuclear energy is seen as necessary to assure national economic well-being and relative independence, if not survival as well. In many countries, the general rise in energy prices and anxieties about the continued availability of foreign sources of fuel has led to the argument that nuclear "wastes" must be recycled, especially in conjunction with breeder reactors that generate their own fuel faster than they can consume it. The danger here is that the generated plutonium is also the chief ingredient in one type of nuclear explosive.

Although general technological and economic trends have had an important impact in spurring the spread of nuclear technology, as a rule political considerations have in the final analysis been the principal determinants. Historically, most national decisions to acquire nuclear technology have focused primarily on the incremental increases to national power or prestige that accompany the attainment of a greater or lesser degree of nuclear status. This phenomenon is most pronounced in the LDCs, but is certainly not unknown in developed countries as well. Scientific and economic benefits deriving from nuclear technology have been sought, but in many cases national political authorities have also attempted to obtain whatever actual or potential military or political advantage they could acquire by assimilating nuclear technology.

The importance of political factors is partially evinced by the adoption of nuclear development plans that are patently unjustifiable in economic terms. Attempts by countries such as Iran, South Korea, Pakistan, and Brazil to acquire spent reactor fuel reprocessing plants are examples where political considerations overrode economic ones. The dual nature of nuclear technology--it can provide peaceful electrical energy while creating a potential for military uses--may serve to disguise ultimate political goals by cloaking them in economic justifications. The assertion that technology should be made freely available may also be used as a ruse for acquiring sensitive nuclear technology for weapons-related purposes. The desire to acquire advanced technology and whatever economic benefits may accrue from obtaining nuclear technology are folded into the national political decision by combining these factors with hoped-for additional political benefits. In the final analysis the commitment to seek nuclear technology will be based in good measure on political grounds, even when there exist technical or economic arguments against doing so.

The decision to move from developing nuclear technology for peaceful purposes to building nuclear explosives or weapons is at times likely to be but the last stage in a succession of national decisions on how to approach the problem of nuclear development. The decision process can be separated into what has been called "high" and "low" politics. Deciding to proceed with the development of nuclear weapons is a matter of supreme policy concern--a question of "high politics." It is

one of the most momentous acts the political leadership of a nation can take, comparable to the decision to go to war. For this reason the circle of decision is usually small, the secrecy surrounding it great, and the commitment to carrying it through strong. The factors compelling such a decision are likely to be so strong, however, that, as with the decision to go to war, the direction of the decision is unlikely to surprise outside observers familiar with the circumstances, although the implementation schedule might be less predictable.

The public policy to create a nuclear power industry, on the other hand, may often be a matter of "low politics." What kinds of nuclear reactors to buy, what elements of the nuclear fuel cycle to acquire (mining, milling, uranium enrichment, fuel fabrication, reprocessing), whether to import the equipment and materials or develop them nationally, these are decisions that may or may not involve the top political leadership. Yet, how political, economic, and technical factors are weighed as matters of "low politics" and the decisions that flow therefrom may structure the options that "high politics" will have in the future. For example, the establishment of an independent national nuclear fuel cycle or the construction of a sophisticated and sizable nuclear research center may facilitate a "high politics" decision to create nuclear explosives. (This phenomenon has been termed "backing in.") Thus decisions and policies that on the surface appear to be independent of the high-politics calculus to build nuclear weapons must be placed in a perspective that appreciates their impact on that calculus.

There is a danger, however, that a fixation on the low politics aspects of the nuclear proliferation problem will cause one to overlook the primary and ultimate determinants. For example, by focusing solely on the proliferation potential of the imported elements of a national nuclear power program, the analysis might miss, on the one hand, the existence of powerful political inhibitions against nuclear weapon development, or, on the other, alternative pathways to nuclear explosives. This does not mean that technical constraints are not important, but rather that they should not be viewed in isolation. No amount of motivation can overcome a lack of economic and technical capabilities. But only the determining political motivation will supply the organization and allocation of resources necessary to translate

economic and technical capabilities into an effective program to develop nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons are clearly not developed in national fits of absentmindedness.

The Nature of Political Motivation

The political authorities of a potential nuclear weapon state will look internally and externally when considering how, when, and whether to develop nuclear explosives or weapons. There will be some overlap between their domestic and foreign considerations since they know that they will be judged internally, in part, on how successfully they manage external challenges.

National survival is the sine qua non of foreign policy. Many political leaders will go no further than a simple security assessment in their calculation of the risks and benefits of fabricating nuclear weapons. There are a number of states that have evidently made their choice on this basis. There are a host of explanations for this trend, but some general ones include the widespread discounting of the credibility or utility of great power and specifically US guarantees, the US defeat in Indochina, the new military potential of some oil producing states and their allies, the growth in strength of of the large Communist powers, and finally the spiraling apprehensions brought on by the proliferation phenomenon itself. Nuclear proliferation can thus be seen as both a response to and a cause of deterioration in international stability. The motivation to develop nuclear weapons is generally most pronounced, however, in states whose national survival is considered threatened.

Internally, political leaders are constantly being called to account on the issue of national security. This may tempt some political leaders to opt for what may be seen as the ultimate guarantor of national security. This temptation may be increased in states where the other props of national security are difficult to arrange, because of shortages of money, manpower, or access to powerful conventional weaponry. Nuclear arms may then be viewed as the most cost-effective and credible solution to a plaguing problem.

Aside from perceived security dilemmas, some states may seek nuclear weapons in order to enhance their regional power and global status. The prestige associated

with nuclear weapons status may be seen as intrinsically desirable and an asset in the accounts of national power.

The prestige associated with a nuclear potential may be attained even if only some of the preliminary thresholds are crossed publicly. The demonstration of scientific competence evinced in operating sophisticated, high technology industries, such as nuclear power facilities, or even impressive scientific research centers, may yield high benefits to the political leaders of an LDC. In some cases, unfortunately, the peaceful benefits of nuclear technology may provide insufficient political returns. To prove that the allocation of scarce resources was worthwhile some LDC leaders may find it necessary to point to a tangible or dramatic increase in national power or prestige, such as a nuclear device. [redacted] 25X1

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The Forces for Change in Mexican Foreign Policy

US-Mexican relations can be described as generally cordial and nonconflictive. Many observers would conclude that they are likely to remain that way at least over the next several years. Because of the presumed high costs to the US of the advent of serious and sustained strains with Mexico, however, this article examines the potential for a major decline in relations. The focus is on how Mexico's foreign policy might change in response to mounting domestic economic problems, possible modifications of its foreign policymaking process, and the prospect that it will become a major oil exporter in the 1980s.*

During the six years of newly elected President Jose Lopez Portillo's administration, Mexico's foreign policy will come under increased pressure to change. The growing need to obtain more benefits for Mexican development from relations with the US and from international relations generally will tend to create new awareness of foreign policy as an important instrument for national development. Furthermore, as foreign policy issues become increasingly tied into crucial domestic concerns, pressures will be felt to improve the foreign policy machinery by expanding its planning and bargaining capability, reducing its susceptibility to presidential whim, and opening it more to broader based bureaucratic expertise.

These tendencies will probably be reinforced by the governing style of the new president, who is more concerned with efficiency and good management than was his predecessor. Finally, Mexico's likely development as a major oil exporter has the potential to increase the assertiveness of Mexican foreign policymakers, particularly as they deal with the US.

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For at least the last three decades the key foreign policy dilemma for Mexican presidents has been how to resolve the contradictions posed by Mexico's strong dependence on the US and its equally strong aspiration for independent nationhood. Their approach to this problem has generally been to strive for close, economically productive ties with the US while, at the same time, using multilateral foreign policy as a platform from which to demonstrate sovereignty and distance from the US. As a consequence, the US aspect of Mexican foreign policy has been relatively pragmatic in content and noncontentious in style. In contrast, foreign policy toward other countries has been utilized mainly for image projection through symbolic gestures and rhetoric.

Under President Luis Echeverria (1970-76) the frequency and intensity of anti-US rhetoric in Mexico's non-US diplomatic activity increased. As a result, world awareness of Mexico grew, in particular because of its active advancement of third world positions. Tensions with the US also increased because of Echeverria's direct public criticisms. Nonetheless, he usually was cooperative enough on bilateral issues of primary concern to the US (for example, efforts to control narcotics) that serious strain did not enter the relationship.

Echeverria's approach to foreign policy did little, however, to ease Mexico's growing economic and social difficulties. He used foreign policy to advance his personal political goals and his vision of Mexico's role in international politics. But he did not treat foreign policy as an activity which could make a major contribution to Mexico's economic development.

In assigning peripheral importance to foreign policy as a development tool, Echeverria followed in the footsteps of previous Mexican leaders. The sense of economic dependence on the US has been so overwhelming that Mexican presidents traditionally have perceived little opportunity or reason to seek non-US economic contributions to development by creating strong ties with other nations or through multilateral diplomacy. Moreover, Mexico's sense of vulnerability to US power has led to the belief that the US holds the upper hand in most bilateral negotiations and that Mexico has little leverage to use in bargaining for benefits.

As a consequence, little pressure has existed for Mexico to develop a foreign policymaking structure that can:

--Rank competing demands and set priorities for action.

--Marshal government and private resources for coordinated use in increasing economic benefits from foreign sources, such as through an expanded trade program.

--Devise broad bargaining strategies and exert leverage effectively.

Instead, foreign policy decisions have remained the personal domain of the Mexican President, operating on the basis of personal beliefs and instincts and the advice of a few close, informal advisers.

The modest expectations held in the past about what Mexico needed from its foreign relations and what it had the capacity to get were probably reasonable. This situation has changed, however. Foreign and internal pressures on the Mexican government have so multiplied that the government will become increasingly less competent to protect national interests and secure important domestic goals unless its foreign policy apparatus is modernized and used more effectively to meet national needs. For example, Mexico's interests could be adversely affected at the practical level if it continues to deal at multilateral meetings mostly in terms of broad rhetorical goals rather than by defining concrete national positions and bargaining for compromises on such North-South issues as debt relief and commodity price stabilization. The government will also find it increasingly difficult to cope with domestic pressures if past attitudes toward foreign policy management in such areas as increasing export earnings are not changed.

If Mexico makes a significant effort to increase its exports, almost certainly the most important foreign exchange earner will become oil. With a major development effort (which now seems likely) Mexico could produce 2.2 million barrels of crude oil per day by 1980. About half of this would be available for export to the US, placing Mexico among the most important potential sources of imported oil for the US.

This development alone is likely to change US-Mexican relations. Among other things, the psychology of negotiations between the two countries may be so affected that, even if Mexico's level of economic dependence on the US does not diminish, the Mexican government will believe and act as if it had gained substantially more leverage in its relationship with the US. This perception of new leverage may affect only oil negotiations and closely related matters. But it seems more likely that the Mexicans will be tempted to link decisions on oil to US concessions in other areas of critical concern to them, ranging from the elimination of trade barriers to US policies on Mexican immigration.

Mexico and the US will probably be able to cope successfully with any change in their relationship reflecting stronger bargaining leverage on the Mexican side. The potential for new strain is developing, however, especially as the magnitude of Mexican internal problems and the need for US assistance grow. At a minimum, a wide range of US-Mexican problems is likely to become highly politicized as the entire network of relations becomes more complex and sensitive to domestic considerations in both countries.

Considerably less potential for change exists for Mexico's largely passive economic and political relationships in Latin America and the Caribbean. It is unlikely that either new threats to or major opportunities for Mexican national security or development will arise in those areas that would compel Mexico to overcome tradition and seek greatly expanded influence in the region.

In the international arena Mexico will face more difficult foreign policy challenges. On many issues in contention between the developed and the developing states, for instance, Mexico is likely to have to choose between a moderate position from which a compromise with the industrial states can be reached and a more radical position designed to appeal to third world unity. The choice will be especially difficult for Mexico because radical opposition to the US on some multilateral issues has been perceived by Mexican leaders as a relatively safe way of reaffirming Mexico's independence from the US. As these issues become more closely tied to important US interests, however, using them to demonstrate symbolic distance from the US runs an increasing danger of creating serious bilateral conflicts. [redacted] 25X1

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